A few years ago, the rich world’s worry about economic interaction with developing countries was that the poor could not profit from it. So unbalanced were the terms of exchange between the North’s mighty industries and the South’s weakling sweatshops trade (31) between the two could be (32) more than exploitation of the one by the other; far from helping the poor countries, global integration would actually deepen their poverty. This fear has now given (33) to a pessimism that is equal and opposite—namely, that trade with the developing world will (34) today’s rich countries.
Like the previous scare, this view contains an iota of truth—enough to lend plausibility. Also like its predecessor, it is a (35) exaggeration. (36), this new fear is more dangerous than the old one. The earlier scare tacitly affirmed that the industrial countries would suffer if they cut their links (37) the third world. Starting from there, campaigning in the North to restrict trade with developing countries was going to be an uphill struggle. Those who oppose deeper economic integration now have a better platform. Vital interests (38) the rich countries to protect their industries from the new onslaught. (39) its predecessor, this idea may sell.
The grip that this thinking already has on popular opinion (40) little to economic history or principles. The new fear, like the old one, expresses the conviction that growth in one part of the world must somehow come (41) another. This is a deeply rooted prejudice, and (42) wrong. Very nearly all of the world is more prosperous now than it was 30 years ago. Growth has been a story of (43) advance, not redistribution; and (44) living standards have not improved in recent decades (notably, in parts of Africa), excessive interaction in the international economy has not been the cause.
Lending useful support to this first error is a second—the idea that there is only so much work to go round. If new technologies render some jobs obsolete, or if an increase in the supply of cheap imports makes other jobs (45), the result must be a permanent rise in unemployment. Again, on a moment’s reflection, this is wrong; otherwise, technological progress this century would have pushed unemployment rates in the industrial countries to something in excess of 95%.